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 Bertil Tungodden  * 
Poverty and Justice: 
A Rawlsian Framework 
The World  Bank  has  recently  argued  that 
"  [n]  o tad shodd commanda higherpriority  for 
the world; policymakers  than that of reducing 
poverty".'  This view is shared by large 
numbers of individuals  and institutions  all 
over the world, and has spurred an enormous 
interest  in ways  of defining and measuring 
the  problem  of  poverty.  The World  Bank 
(1  992,  1993) has  introduced guidelines for 
<< Poverty  Assessments"  to  be  done  for  all 
borrower countries, official poverty lines have 
been introduced in the U.S. and EU, UNDP 
presents annual reports on absolute poverty 
in  developing  countries,  and  numerous 
researchers have developed new methods for 
dealing with aggregation problems in poverty 
measurement. The aim of all this work has of 
course been to contribute to the alleviation of 
poverty, by focusing attention and improving 
our understanding of the problem. 
This  focus  on  poverty  has  not  been 
unchallenged,  though, and the relevance  of 
the concept of poverty has been questioned.' 
Is there any meaningful definition of poverty, 
and  if  so,  why  should  we  pay  particular 
attention to the poor  in our evaluation  of 
changes in a society? In most cases, these two 
questions are not dealt with thoroughly, and 
seemingly rather arbitrary arguments underly 
suggested  definitions  of  the  problem  of 
poverty. Therefore,  in  this  paper,  I  address 
these issues by  elaborating on some possible 
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.,  ,,L.  1. links  between  normative  reasoning  and  a 
well-founded  understanding of the concept 
of  poverty.  In  particular,  I  discuss  the 
Rawlsian  framework,  which  frequently  is 
referred to as the normative basis for focusing 
on the  problem  of poverty.  First,  I  survey 
some general arguments that can be used in 
clarifying the concept of poverty. Thereafier, 
I link this discussion to the Rawlsian frame- 
work,  and  illustrate  why  there  is  a  deep 
unresolved  difficulty within this framework 
that  may  be  of  importance  in  debating 
poverty. Finally, I suggest some possible ways 
of resolving  this  difficulty  and explore  the 
implications  for  our  understanding  of  the 
concept  of  poverty  within  the  Rawlsian 
framework. 
Why care about poverty? 
The concept of poverty does not make sense 
without  a  poverty  line  that  divides  the 
population into poor and non-poor pe~ple.~ 
Hence  in  order  to  provide  an  interesting 
interpretation of poverty in a society, we have 
to defend a particular poverty line.'  In other 
words, we have to argue that there is a poverty 
line  that  conveys  something  of  normative 
relevance,  and  hence  justifies  that  we  pay 
particular  attention to  the group of people 
below this line. 
The framework  of  a Bergson-Samuelson 
social  welfare  function  can  provide  some 
general structure on this discussion.'  (In the 
following,  I  shall  not pay  any attention  to 
how  we  define  individual  well-being  and 
make interpersonal comparisons, but simply 
assume  that  the utiliw  functions  represent 
individual well-being in a reasonable way and 
that  absolute  interpersonal  comparisons  of 
well-being is possible.) A Bergson-Samuelson 
social welfare function reflects an ordering of 
social states, and within this framework the 
only elements that affect this ordering are the 
levels of individual utility (or well-being)  in 
the various  social states  and the normative 
position we take up on how to weigh these 
utility  levels  in  an  aggregate  evaluation. 
Hence, if we adopt this line of reasoning, any 
normative  defence  of  a  poverty  line  must 
either  derive from  some particular  assump- 
tions about the shape of the utility functions 
of individuals or about the shape of the social 
welfare function (or about both of them). We 
shall refer to the first possibility as the well- 
being  defence  of  a  poverty  line  and  the 
second  as  the  social  welfare  defence  of  a 
poverty  line,  though,  obviously  they  are 
closely linked. It almost goes without saying 
that  any well-being  defence  of the poverty 
line needs to be be backed  up with a social 
welfare argument; i.e. we need to explain why 
we should pay particular attention to people 
below a poverty line, even if this poverty line 
is supported by an argument about the shape 
of the utility function. But nevertheless, in 
the following, these  two  lines  of  reasoning 
shall be treated separately, and the rest of this 
section  is  devoted  to briefly  exploring the 
possibility  of  a  well-being  defence  of  the 
poverty line. 
Conventionally,  a  poverty  line  has  been 
interpreted  as  refering  to  the  lack  of  ful- 
3 . Of  course, it may be the case that we should accept that the poverty line may vary over a certain range, but that 
is not an important issue for the following discussion as long as we assume that the range is finite. See Atkinson 
(1987) on this question. 
4. This issue is discussed in more detail in Tungodden (1  995). 
5.  See Sen (1986) for s formal discussion of the Bergson-Samuelson  framework. In this discussion, I  avoid the 
issue of numerical representation of the ranking of social states; the purpose of introducing this framework is 
solely to provide a generd structure on how co  chink about morally relevant argumenrs in a discussion of [he 
Doverw line. 
--  -- filment  of  some  basic  needs.  By  way  of 
illustration, poor people are often defined as 
those who are undernourished, uneducated, 
unsheltered, excluded from social life, and so 
on, and contrasted with non-poor people that 
are  well  nourished,  educated,  healthy, 
sheltered, and capable of participating fully in 
society. This position is in many cases backed 
up by a well-being defence of poverty, where 
the view  is  that people experience a funda- 
mental change in well-being when these basic 
needs  are  fulfilled  (see for  example Weigel 
1786).  The idea  is  that  these  basic  needs 
derive from the core attributes of human life 
- biological  existence,  human  intelligence, 
md human sociality -  and that they therefore 
represent needs of particular importance. 
This line of reasoning has some intuitive 
appeal, but it faces problems when we try to 
be  more  precise  on what  it means  to  have 
these basic needs fulfilled. Obviously, biolo- 
gical existence is  a core attribute of human 
life,  but when  are  the  needs  derived  from 
biological  existence  fulfilled?  By  way  of 
illustration, according to this perspective, the 
development  of  more  advanced  security 
equipment  in  new  cars  contributes  to  the 
fulfillment of a basic need. And so would any 
activity aimed at increasing our life expectan- 
cy,  whether  it  is  attained  by  putting more 
resources into medical research, weather fore- 
casting, or the development of more hygienic 
kitchen equipment! Certainly, the contribu- 
tions to increased life expectancy from some 
of  these  activities  will  be  rather  modest 
(compared to what can be attained by the use 
of the same resources in other areas), but that 
is not an important issue in this discussion. If 
the aim of these activities is  to contribute to 
biological existence (i.,  a longer life), then 
they  contribute to the fulfilment  of a basic 
~ieed. 
Similarly,  with  respect  to  human 
iri~elli~ence  and huinan sociality: there exist a 
vast number of activities that aim at contri- 
buting  to  these  areas  of human  life,  and 
which  consequently  contribute  to  the  ful- 
filment  of  basic  needs.  But  many of  these 
activities are  not  assigned  priority  by  most 
people; we prefer to use resources on  activities 
that contribute substantially to the fulfilment 
of non-basic needs instead of applying them 
to  activities  that  contribute  to  minor  im- 
provements  in  these  basic dimensions.  We 
spend more  money on pure  entertainment 
than  on  security  equipment,  although  the 
latter and not the former provides fulfilment 
of  a basic  need  (as  it  is  defined  here).  Of 
course, people's behaviour cannot prove any- 
thing with regard to these questions, but in 
this case it may point at something essential. 
Even if we can single out some core attributes 
of  human  life  that  are  universal,  these 
attributes do not necessarily provide us with 
an interesting defence of the poverty line. A 
poverty line founded on a normative position 
that in general assigns absolute priority to the 
fulfilment of basic needs faces two problems: 
first, in many cases it will be in conflict with 
people's own  evaluation  of  states of affairs, 
because  people  do  not  in  general  assign 
absolute  priority  to  the fulfilment  of  basic 
needs. Second, it will include everyone in the 
poor group, because we  all  have unfulfilled 
basic needs. 
However,  it  may  still  be  the  case  that 
people experience a fundamental change in 
well-being when  some basic  needs  are  ful- 
filled -  the discussion so far has only outlined 
difficulties with  the approach that links the 
problem of poverty to fulfilment of any basic 
need. People do assign absolute priority to the 
fulfilment of certain basic needs in particular 
situations;  by  way  of  illustration,  famine 
victims  are  not  willing  to  give  up  their 
entitlements  to  some  food  for  whatever 
amount of anything Can this fact indicate an 
interesting poverty line?  Maybe, but there is a complication, due to the fact that in many  everyone is  capable  of being  reasonable and 
situations  we  have  to  evaluate  alternatives  rational),  and  thus  these liberties should  be 
that  involve  uncertainty.  If people  in  these 
situations always  are willing to make  some 
trade-off  among  dimensions  (which  is 
assumed  in  expected  utility  theory  by 
invoking a continuity axiom),  then a social 
choice rule that assigns absolute priority  to 
the fulfilment of some basic needs will be in 
conflict with people's own evaluation of these 
alternatives. Is this a problem? In general, we 
have  difficulties  with  a  social  ordering  of 
alternatives that is in conflict with the Pareto 
principle (which would be the case here) and, 
moreover, it is  hard to see how to defend a 
fundamental change in the principle guiding 
our ranking of alternatives when uncertainty 
enters the stage (how can we defend that we 
assign absolute priority to the fulfilment of 
basic  needs  facing  certainty  but not when 
facing uncertainty?). 
But one possibility should be  mentioned. 
Rawls (1993) -  in defending absolute priority 
to certain  basic liberties in social choicesG - 
connects the basic liberties with the concep- 
tion of person used in his theory of justice, and 
argues that in order to settle which  liberties 
should be assigned absolute priority we have to 
"consider which  liberties  are  essential social 
conditions for the adequate development and 
full  exercise  of  the  two  powers  of  moral 
personality  [to  wit,  to  be  reasonable  and 
rationd]  over  a complete  life"  (p. 293). To 
assign absolute priority to these liberties is in 
Rawls'  view  a prerequisite  for establ;ching a 
moral  community (i.e.  a community where 
recognised  as  incommensurable  to  other 
interests by every member of society. If this line 
of reasoning is sound, then it may be the case 
that an interesting poverty line can be defended 
by including among the liberties (though the 
wording  may  be  somewhat  awkward)  the 
liberty from hunger, illiteracy, and so on. At the 
moment I am  unable to give a good account of 
this kind of defence, but I shall return to this 
issue briefly in the final section. 
In the rest of the paper I shall concentrate 
on exploring social welfare arguments that can 
support a definition of poverty. This part of 
the  Bergson-Samuelson  framework  is  more 
complex, though, because we first of all need 
to clarify what  is  meant by a social welfare 
function.  It  raises  the  question  about  the 
connections  between  private  and  public 
morality, which has been at the centre of the 
stage in moral philosophy from the time of 
Plato.  I  shall  not elaborate  on the problem 
here, and in particular I shall not deal with the 
essential issue  in  the political  philosophy of 
liberalism (i.e., about how we ought to behave 
in situations where people disagree about the 
proper shape of the social welfare function). 
In  the following, I  shall simply interpret  a 
social welfare function as representing a view 
about  what  principle  ought  to  govern  the 
distribution of resources in a society. 
Rawls and Social Choice Theory 
Frequently, the Rawlsian framework is  con- 
sidered as providing normative arguments for 
6.  Rawls' proposes two principles of justice, where the first principle - stating that "[elach person has an equal right 
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all" 
(Rawls 1993:291) -  is assigned absolute priority. The second principle is concerned with social and economic 
inequalities, and I discuss the second part of this principle in detail in the following sections. The first part of 
the second principle states that "social and economic inequalities ... must be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls 1993:291). 1 do not discuss this and many 
other important aspects of Rawls' theory any further, because, as I see it, they are not essential for the purpose 
of this paper. 
--  - why we should care about poverty, and there- 
fore I shall in the following concentrate on 
this  position  in  debating  a  social  welfare 
defence of the poverty line. In this section, 
though, I shall make a minor digression, and 
briefly overview some criticisim that is raised 
against  Rawlsian  reasoning  in  social choice 
theory.  The  aim  of  this  digression  is  to 
mot,ivate the  discussion  that follows in the 
next section, where I stress the importance of 
understanding the actual structure in Rawls' 
theory of justice. This change in perspective - 
from  the  conventional  view  on  Rawlsian 
reasoning  to what I suggest as  a reasonable 
interpretation  of  this  framework  -  is  - 
important, because it enlightens the possible 
relevance of a poverty line in the part of his 
theory of justice that deals with distributional 
issues. 
Rawls  (1 971,1993)  suggests  that  we 
should assign absolute priority to the worst 
off  in  the  distribution  of  income,  and 
conventionally  this  normative  proposal  is 
referred to as  the Difference Principle or the 
Leximin  Prin~iple.~  Rawls  illustrates  this 
position by discussing a two-person case, and 
he argues that in these situations "  [i] t suffices 
[in order to apply this Principle] that the least 
favored  person  can  be  identified  and  his 
rational  preference  determined"  (RawIs 
(1971:7 1, my  emphasis). This passage  has 
strongly influenced the interpretation of the 
Rawlsian  position  in  social  choice  theory, 
where the Leximin Principle is presented as a 
principle that assigns dictatorial power to the 
worst-off position in distributional  issue^.^ 
The principle  has  been  attacked  for  two  I 
different  reasons.  First,  it  has  been  argued 
that  the Leximin  Principle  has  wholly  un- 
acceptable moral implications in distributing 
resources among members  of a society and 
among generations. Arrow (1  973) may serve 
as  an  illustration  of  this  line  of  criticism 
within an  intragenerational  context:  "[TI he 
[Leximin  Principle]  has  some  implications 
that seem hardly acceptable. It implies  that 
any  benefit,  no  matter  how  small,  to  the 
worst-off  member  of society will  outweigh 
any loss to a better-off individual, provided it 
does not reduce the second below the level of 
the first. Thus, there can easily exist medical 
procedures which serve to keep people barely 
alive but with little satisfaction, and which are 
yet so expensive as  to reduce the rest of the 
population to poverty.  [The Leximin Princi- 
ple]  would  apparently  imply  that  such 
procedures be adopted." (p. 252). In a similar 
vein, Solow (1  974) has criticised the principle 
in  the context of intergenerational  distribu- 
tion: "My impression  is  that.. .  the  [Leximin 
Principle]  does not function very well  as  a 
principle  of intergenerational  equi  ty... [TI  he 
[Leximin Principle]  is  so much at mercy of 
the  initial  conditions.  If  the  initial  capital 
stock is very small, no more will be accumu- 
lated and the standard of living will be low 
forever.. .  [the Leximin Principle]  requires an 
initial capital stock big enough to support a 
decent standard of living, else it perpetuates 
poverty, but it can not tell us why the initial 
capital stock should ever have been accumu- 
lated."  (p.  33-41).9 The  moral  intuition 
- - 
7.  Rawls ofren uses the more comprehensive notion of primary goods, but this broader approach easily involves the 
problem of indexing. To escape this problem, Rawls assumes that these other primary goods are sufficiently 
correlated with income (see Rawls (1971:97). Thus, our focus on the distribution of income is justifiable,  and 
nothing of interest is lost in this context by adapting this narrow approach to the Difference Principle. 
3.  See among others Arrow (1973), Binmore (1994), Dechamps and Gevers (1978), Hammond (1976), Harsanyi 
(1  976), and Sen (1 970,1986). 
9.  Surely, Rawls (1971  :284-293) does not recommend the Leximin Principle in the context of intergenerational 
distribution, but still it is of some interest for o'ur purpose to explore the arguments of Solow on this issue. underlying both these arguments seems to be 
that  it  is  not  reasonable  to  claim  that  we 
ought to accept that everyone else in a society 
(or every other generation) should  have  to 
live  in  destitution  if  that  contributes  to  a 
minor  improvement in  the situation of the 
- 
worst off person (or generation). Rawls may 
counter these  attacks by  invoking the rele- 
vance of the notion of reflective equilibrium. 
He may argue that the fact that the Leximin 
Principle  does  not  match  our  considered 
judgements in these questions is due to to the 
fact that our present sense of justice is subject 
to  irregularities and distortions.  lo Shortly, I 
shall explain why he does not necessarily need 
to come out with such an argument in this 
case, but let us first look at the second line of 
criticism against the Leximin Principle. 
The  procedural  argument  applied  by 
Rawls in defending his theory of justice has 
also been strongly questioned. Rawls argues 
that a principle of justice  should be derived 
from studying the choice people would make 
behind a veil of ignorance, which of course is 
nothing but a thought experiment imposed 
on us to formalise the idea of rational delibe- 
ration (see Rawls (1  97  1:  138). 1 shall not go 
into  a  detailed  description  of  the  original 
position; the important part to have in mind 
in  our  context  is  that  Rawls  argues  that 
people in this situation would follow a maxi- 
min  strategy, and  therefore,  he  argues,  we 
should also apply the Difference Principle in 
regulating  the  basic  institutions  in  society. 
This  line  of  reasoning  has  been  seriously 
cluestioned  by  among  others  Harsanyi 
(1976),  who argues that the view is inconsist- 
ent with what the Bayesian school of thought 
svould  suggest  you  should  do  under 
uncertainty  blorcover,  according  to 
Harsanyi, it has implausible implications if it 
is applied in daily life:"Ifyou  took the [Lexi- 
min Principle] seriously then you could not 
ever cross a street (after all, you might be hit 
by a car); you could never drive over a bridge 
(after all, it might collapse); you could never 
get  married  (after  all,  it  might  end  in  a 
disaster), etc. If anybody really acted this way 
he would soon end up in a mental institu- 
tion" (p. 40). Hence the Leximin Principle is 
not a good rule to follow in private choices, 
and therefore neither can it be what people 
suggest  after  rational  deliberation  in  distri- 
butional  issues.  The problem  of  Rawlsian 
reasoning,  according to  Harsanyi, is  that  a 
mistake  is  made  in  the  description  of  the 
choice that people would make behind a veil 
of ignorance,  though  Harsanyi  agrees with 
Rawls on applying a procedural  method in 
deriving a theory of justice. 
However, it is not obvious that we should 
pay too much attention to these arguments in 
debating this framework, because they do not 
attack  the  theory  of  justice  proposed  by 
Rawls. Rawls does not say that we should give 
absolute priority to the worst-off position in 
distributional questions, though it is true that 
he  illustrates  his  theory  in  this  way  in 
discussing  a  two-person  case.  Moreover, 
Rawls  models  the  choice  in  the  original 
position as a choice without knowledge about 
probabilities, and the relevance of Harsanyi's 
attack is far from obvious when we take both 
these aspects into account. Hence in order to 
evaluate the relevance of this criticism (which 
is important in order to see whether we want 
to  stay  within  this  framework)  and  the 
possible link between a poverty line and the 
Differsnce  Principle,  we  have  to  be  more 
precise  about  the  contcnt  of  this  part  of 
Rawls' theory of justice. 
10. See Rawls (1971:48-  5 1) for  discussinn of the notio  n of reflective equilibrium. Rawls on the Difference Principle 
Rawls  (1971,1993) is  concerned about the 
well-being of the least advantaged segment in 
society (and not only the well-being  of the 
least advantaged person  or generation): "In 
any case we are to aggregate to some degree 
over the expectations of the worst off...[The 
person  in  the  original  position]  interprets 
[the Difference Principle] from the first as a 
limited aggregative principle and assesses it as 
such in comparison with other standards. It is 
not  as  if  they  agreed  to  think of the  least 
advantaged  as  literally  the  worst  off 
individu  al..." (Rawls 197  1  :98). 
Thus Rawls proposes a criterion of justice 
[hat  allows  a  trade-off  between  gains  and 
losses  of  people  that  belong  to  the  least 
advantaged segment in  society, but neglects 
changes  in  the conditions of the better-off 
group as relevant in evaluating redistribution 
schemes (as far as  the members of the least 
advantaged  segment  are  not  indifferent 
between  the  income  distributions  in  ques- 
tion). We may label this  the Leximingroup 
Principle. The move  from a Leximin  Prin- 
ciple to a Leximingroup Principle is  not at all 
trivial, and it introduces the difficult question 
about  how  to define  the  least  advantaged 
segment. The Leximin  Principle is  clear on 
this issue -  we assign absolute priority to the 
worst-off position -  but there is  no implicit 
!guideline  in  the  Leximingroup  Principle 
about  how  to  define  the  least  advantaged 
segment.  Certainly,  Rawls  recognises  the 
need for a definition of the least advantaged 
segment, and he makes some ad hoc sugges- 
tions. Shortly, I shall return to a discussion of 
rhcsc proposals, but before I do that I want ro 
stiess  the  importance  of  this  issue.  Rawls 
admits that "  [r] he serious difficulty [with rhe 
Leximin Principle] is how to define the least 
fortunate group"  (Rawls (1  971  :98), but still 
he does not devote too much attention to rhe 
quesrion.  I  shall  claim  that  Rawls  has  not 
provided us with any proposal of a criterion 
of justice  on distributional  issues before  he 
has outlined a more precise position on how 
to define the least advantaged segment; the 
definition of this segment is precisely what is 
at stake in contrasting this theory with other 
proposals  about  how  to  regulate  the  basic 
institutions  in  society  (e.g.,  the  classical 
utilitarian perspective). 
The importance of the definition  of the 
least  advantaged  group  in  debating  Rawls' 
theory of justice  is easily seen if we return to 
the arguments  of Arrow  and Solow. They 
both find the Difference Principle repugnant, 
because  the  principle  can  support  an 
infinitely large number of other people or ge- 
nerations living in destitution if that contri- 
butes  to  a  minor  improvement  in  the 
standard of living of the worst off person or 
generation. But the appeal of these arguments 
may be lost if we take into account the fact 
that  the  Difference  Principle  refers  to  a 
group. A Leximingroup Principle will allow a 
trade-off  among  the  members  of the  least 
advantaged group, and only demand absolute 
priority to the interests of the members of this 
group  in  situations  where  their  common 
interests are in conflict with the interests of 
the rest of the population. Hence, if everyone 
who lives in destitution is defined as part of 
the least advantaged group in society (which 
of  course  may  imply  that  in  some  poor 
societies everyone is  part of the least advan- 
taged group), then Arrow and Solow have to 
rephrase their intuitive argument. Obviously, 
they may claim that in any case they find it 
repugnant that a minor improvement in the 
living  standard  of  the  least  advantaged 
members  of  society  should  demand  a 
substantial reduction in the well-being of the 
better off group, even if the becter off group 
still would be very well off. But that would be 
a.  general  argument  against  giving absolute 
priority to anyone,  and not -  as  the initial argument -  be based on the moral intuition  group,  an  issue  I  return  to  in  final section.  1 
that it is too extreme to demand that every- 
one  else  should  live  in  destitution  if  that 
improves  the  well-being  of  the  worst  off 
position.  Similarly, Harsanyi claims that the 
Leximin  Principle  would be  a poor rule  to 
follow  in  private  choices,  because  it would 
make  us  obsessed  with  the  possibility  of 
experiencing disasterous consequences of our 
choices. The relevance of this claim, though, 
is less obvious in the context of a Leximing- 
roup  Principle  (which  would  allow  some 
trade-offs  between  the  worst  alternatives), 
but, once again, it depends on how the least 
advantaged group is defined in this case. 
Anyway, this should illustrate that we need 
to clarify our understanding of how to define 
the least  advantaged  segment before we  can 
properly  evaluate  the  theory  of  justice 
suggested by Rawls, and I shall now turn to a 
discussion of this issue. The possible relevance 
of this exercise for our discussion about how to 
define the problem of poverty should be clear. 
Ifwe are able to find a reasonable definition of 
the  least  advantaged  segment  and  accept 
Rawls' defence of the Leximingroup Principle, 
then  we  have  one  possible  social  welfare 
defence of a poverty line. In this case, poverty 
can refer  to those people who belong to the 
least advantaged segment in Rawls' theory, and 
Rawlsian  reasoning  will  motivate  why  we 
should assign absolute priority to the allevia- 
tion of this type of poverty. Whether this will 
be a reasonable interpretation of  the concept of 
poverty remains to be discussed afier we have 
clarified the definition of the least advantaged 
What does Rawls suggest on the subject of 
defining the  least  advantaged  segment? He 
proposes two alternative approaches. On the 
one hand, he argues, we may refer to a social 
position,  say  unskilled  workers,  when  we 
define the least advantaged segment, and then 
"count as  the least advantaged all those with 
the average income and wealth of this group" 
(Rawls (1  97 1  :98) Alternatively, according to 
Rawls, we  may define "all  persons with less 
than half of the median  income and wealth 
...  as  the lest advantaged segment"  (ibid.,  p. 
98). But none of these suggestions are parti- 
cularly appealing (at least without any further 
support). Why should we completely ignore 
the interests of those unskilled workers that 
have a level of income just above the average 
of this group, and what is the normative rele- 
vance  of  the  median  income  in  a  society 
(which certainly can be a.  very low income in 
poor societies and the income of a superrich 
person in a rich society)? Rawls defends him- 
self against such charges by saying that "we are 
entitled  at  some  point  to  plead  practical 
considerations in  formulating the difference 
principle.  Sooner  or  later  the  capacity  of 
philosophical  or  other  arguments  to  make 
finer  discriminations  is  bound  to  run  out" 
(ibid., p. 98).  That may very well be true, but 
it is not satisfactory that the core of a principle 
ofjustice should be given such ad hoc defence. 
And would it be possible to provide a philo- 
sophical defence for a Leximingroup Principle 
without explaining who it is we  are claiming 
shall be given absolute priority?'  ' 
11. Some readers may want to argue that this problem is closely linked to the informationd consrraints char we face 
in practical policy debates. Obviously, we are in many cases unable to observe the least 2dvantaged position in 
a society, .md hence we have to take groups of  as a point of departure in evduating various redistribu- 
tion schemes. Thus it may seem like the informational constraint imposes on rhe analysis a definition of the 
least advantaged group in society. But is this a promising solution to our problem? Is it resonable to ignore a 
large group of people's interests - possibly very destirute persons - because we are able to identify their position 
as slightly betrer than a small group of orher people? Rawls (197  1) does nor seem to have chis line of reasoning 
in mind, and I ignore these informational constraints in the following. In defending a Leximingroup Principle an 
implicit  understanding  of  the  least  advan- 
taged segment is needed, and therefore I shall 
elaborate on the general arguments applied 
by Rawls in his discussion of this principle. 
Rawls defends the Leximingroup Principle by 
the use of two different arguments. He gives 
both  a  defence  derived  from  a  procedural 
notion  of  justice  and  a  defence  based  on 
morally  intuitive  arguments,  and  it  is 
interesting to notice that the implicit under- 
standing of  the  least  advantaged  segment 
seems  to  be  different  in  the  two  lines  of 
reasoning. In the procedural argument, Rawls 
indicates that the least advantaged segment 
refers to everyone that has less resources than 
what is needed in order to attain a maximum 
level  of well-being.  He argues  that  in  the 
original position "the person choosing has a 
conception  of the  good  such  that he  cares 
very little, if anything, for what he might gain 
above the minimum stipend that he can, in 
fact, be sure of by following the [Difference 
Principle]"  (Rawls  (1971:  154-1  56).  The 
intuitive argument, however,  gives  a some- 
what different impression about the implicit 
definition  of the least  advantaged segment: 
"It seems to be one of the fixed points of our 
considered judgments  that  no  one deserves 
his place in the distribution of native endow- 
ments,  any  more  than  one  deserves  one's 
initial  starting  place  in  society.  ..Thus  the 
more  advantaged  representative  man can  not 
say that he deserves and therefore has a right 
to a scheme of cooperation  in which he is 
permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do 
not contribute to the welfare of others. There 
is no basis for his making this claim" (ibid., p. 
104, my  emphasis). Implicit  in  this  line of 
reasoning seems to be the idea that the least 
advantaged segment should refer  to 
who initially are disadvantaged due to moral- 
ly arbitrary factors,  but  there  is  nothing in 
this  argument  saying that  the  more advan- 
taged people  have  no hrther interest  in an 
increase in their amount of resources beyond 
what  they  will  attain  if  they  accept  the 
Leximingroup Principle. 
The procedural argument of Rawls avoids 
the  real  issue  in  distributional  justice,  by  , 
I 
(more  or  less)  claiming  that  there  is  no 
conflict  between  our  moral  obligations  as 
stated by  the Difference Principle  and self- 
interest.  Why should the  more advantaged 
part  of  the  population  object  to  the 
Difference Principle if  there  is  little, or no, 
reason  for trying  to do better? Moreover,  I 
question the possibility of defending the view 
that there  is  an  upper limit to the level of 
well-being that can be enjoyed by people, and 
hence I find the assumption of Rawls on this 
issue contentious. More generally, though, I 
doubt the relevance of arguments based  on 
procedural arguments of the kind invoked by 
constructing  the  original  position.  The 
intention of the original position is to impose 
certain  conditions  and  restrictions  on  our 
rational  deliberation  about  principles  of 
justice. But what should these conditions and 
restrictions  be  like? What  conditions  and 
restrictions should we impose on our rational 
deliberation  about  what  conditions  and 
restrictions we should impose on our rational 
deliberation  about  principles  of justice  (in 
other  words,  what  should  the  original 
position where people choose what procedure 
to apply in order to choose the principles of 
justice look like)?  As  is easily seen, this line of 
reasoning implies an infinite regress, and thus 
it follows that at some point we have to accept 
that we are unable to impose any restrictions 
or conditions on our rational  deliberation. 
Rawls claims that this point should be where 
we  discuss  the  structure  of  the  procedure 
where the theory of justice is chosen, and he 
defends his  view with  the assumption  that 
- 
"there is  a broad measure of agreement that 
principles of justice should be chosen under certain  conditions  (Rawls  (1  971: 18).  But 
that is  simply not true, as  illustrated by the 
disagreement  between  Harsanyi  and  Rawls 
on  this  issue.  Both  invoke  the  original 
position in debating theories of justice  (and 
both,  I  should say,  deliberate  rationally  on 
what restrictions  to  impose on our rational 
deliberation),  but  they  strongly  disagree 
about  whether  to  use  probabilities  in  the 
original  position  or not.  Rawls  argues  that 
"the veil  of  ignorance  excludes all  but  the 
vaguest knowledge of likelihoods. The parties 
have  no basis  for determining the probable 
nature of their society, or their place  in  it" 
(ibid., p. 155). Harsanyi (1755),  on the other 
hand,  claims  that  a  reasonable  way  of 
approaching this problem is  to assume that 
every person in the original position "had an 
equal chance of obtaining any of the social 
positions existing in this situation, from the 
highest to the lowest" (p. 3 16). Certainly, the 
assumption  we  make  on  this  issue  is 
important for  the  outcome of our rational 
deliberation under  these  conditions,  but  at 
the same  time we  find  it hard  to  settle by 
rational deliberation which assumption best 
characterises  a good  way  of doing rational 
deliberation about principles of justice. In my 
view, it will be more fruitful to debate various 
principles  of justice  by  exploring  the  basic 
properties  of  these  principles  and  then 
conduct unconstrained  rational deliberation 
on these properties by using intuitive moral 
arguments. " 
Therefore,  in  the  following  I  shall  con- 
centrate on debating the intuitive argument 
chat  Rawls  applies  in  defending  the 
Difference Principle, where the aim is  to see 
whether  this line of reasoning provides any  - - 
congenial definition  of the least advantaged 
group within  this  framework  (and thereby 
also provides an interesting definition of the 
poverty line). 
Unconstrained Rational Deliberation on 
the Difference Principle 
Rawls (1771) argues that natural capacity and 
starting point  in  life  are  morally  arbitrary 
factors that should not influence the distribu- 
tion of social goods. We might expect that it 
followed  from  this  perspective  that  an 
Equality Principle -  and not a Leximingroup 
Principle -  should govern the design of basic 
institutions in society. However, a principle 
assigning absolute priority to equality faces a 
deep  problem;  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
Pareto Principle  (if defined  in  the space of 
individual  preferences)  and  the  Betterness 
Principle, as defined by Broome13 (if defined 
in  the  space  of  individual  well-being).  In 
other words, a principle of equality may argue 
that social state A is preferred to social state B 
even if everyone prefers B to A and, moreover, 
even if everyone is better off in B than A. This 
is recognised by Rawls (1971), and therefore 
he suggests that we  substitute a principle of 
equality  with  the  Difference  Principle:  "If 
there  are  inequalities in  the  basic  structure 
that  work  to  make  everyone  better  off  in 
comparison  with  the  benchmark  of  initial 
equality, why not permit them?" (p. 1  5 1). 
Certainly, it is hard to see how to defend an 
Equality Principle as a final principle in social 
choices, and therefore I agree with Rawls that 
12. Broome (1  99  1) is, in my view, an illuminating illustration of this approach. Notice that this line of reasoning 
applies che same general strategy as the constructive method of Rawls. It attempts to establish agreement about 
final principles of justice by attaining agreement at some "distance" from these principles (i.e about the proper 
baic principles) and then showing that this agreement should imply (by the rules of logic) agreement abour 
certain final principles. 
13. Broome (1991). we  have  to  move  away  from  this criterion. 
But  can  the  idea  of  equality  still  tell  us 
something  about  how  to  define  the  least 
advantaged group within this framework? At 
first glance,  it  may  seem  like  a  reasonable 
suggestion  to  define  the  least  advantaged 
group  as  everyone  who  has  less  than  the 
average amount of resources in society. Rawls 
nrgues that there are good moral reasons for 
&iming  that everyone should have the same 
opportunities in life, but that is not the case 
in situations with inequality. If resources are 
distributed unequally (and let us here assume 
that people  have  the same ability to attain 
well-being from a given amount of resources), 
then  those who have  less  than  the  average 
amount  of  resources  are  deprived  of  the 
possibilities that everyone could have enjoyed 
if  the  overall  amount  of  resources  where 
equally distributed. Hence it seems congenial 
to  argue  that  the  least  advantaged  group 
should be linked to the average income in a 
society.  Moreover,  defining the least  advan- 
raged group in  this way provides  us  with a 
good argument in favor of assigning absolute 
piority to the interests of the members of this 
group; why should we  pay any attention to 
the  well-being  of those who already  enjoy 
more  than  what  everyone  can  enjoy  if we 
distribute resources equally? 
However, as I have shown elsewherel-I,  this 
approach faces a serious problem. In fact, it 
tur:is  out chat the only Leximingroup Prin- 
ciple chat is consistent with the Pareto Prin- 
ciplc (or the Betterncss Principle) is the Lexi- 
min Principle.  In other words, if we  define 
the least advantaged group as  everyone that 
has less than average income (or well-being), 
then it follows that we have to assign absolute 
priority to the worst off member of this group 
in order not to violate the Pareto  Principle. 
Moreover, this result  holds for every cut-off 
line that is dependent on the overall amount 
of resources present in society. I have already 
argued  against  the  Leximin  Principle,  and 
hence we need to explore other possibilities. 
The Leximingroup Principle is not of much 
interest as a final principle in social choices if 
the least  advantaged  group is  defined  by  a 
cut-off  line  that  is  relative  to  the  income 
distribution. 
What  other  possibilities  are  there  with 
respect to this problem of defining a proper 
cut-off line? One possibility is of course -  as 
suggested by Rawls -  to link the least advan- 
taged group to a particular segment of society, 
say, the 15% of the population that is at the 
bottom of the income (or well-being) distri- 
bution.15 However,  this is  obviously a poor 
suggestion, because  it is  impossible  to find 
any  reasonable  normative  support  for  the 
Leximingroup  Principle  irl  this  context.  In 
some cases (and for any percentage chosen), 
this  type of cut-off  line  would  imply that 
people that are very well off and have far more 
than the average income in society are part of 
the least advantaged group; in other cases, pe- 
ople utterly deprived and with an income le- 
vel  far  below  the  average  income  may  be 
excluded from the least advantaged group. It 
is  hard  to  see  why  we  should  apply  the 
Lximin  Principle  in  cases  of  this  kind. 
1.i. 5;ngcdden (1994). Some minor qualifications are needed in order co  atcnin the resulcs I refer co in [his pasage, 
I;ui, conventionally, these qualifications are considered unproblematic. 
15. 'l'his possibility has also been advocated by Pogge (1  389). He  claims chat: "The fraction to be chosen rnust fall 
vii:hin  a cci-rain range .-  raust bc laige enough co  appeal to the parties' interest that their criterion should issue 
ill definite and significant demands for situations of injustice and must be small enough co appeal ro che parties' 
i:~csrcst  to aim these demands specifically at improving the worst shares. Half a percent is too small and 60 
percent too large, though  both 4 percent  and 20 percent may be argunble"  (y. 204). Admittedly, I  find ir 
difficlilt to untierstand rhe line of reasoning underlying this par-ticular claim. Therefore,  even  if  this  line  of  reasoning 
makes  it  possible  for  us  to  construct  a 
Leximingroup  Principle  that  both  differs 
from  the Leximin  Principle  and is  not in- 
consistent with the Pareto principle  (or the 
Betterness  principle), it still  does not have 
much moral appeal. 
A  final  possibility  is  to define  the  least 
advantaged group by an absolute cut-off line 
that is independent of the overall amount of 
resources in society. This approach also makes 
it  possible  to  construct  a  Leximingroup 
Principle that both differs from the Leximin 
Principle  and is  consistent with  the Pareto 
Principle (or the Betterness Principle), and, 
moreover, has  some intuitive moral  appeal. 
By  way of  illustration,  the absolute cut-off 
line  may refer  to  the level  of income that 
people need in order to buy a certain amount 
of  calories,  and  then  a  Leximingroup 
Principle could be defined in such a way that 
we  choose the social state with the smallest 
overall poverty gap, i.e.,  the smallest overall 
income deficiency compared to the absolute 
cut-off line. 
However,  this is  an important step away 
from the basic idea in Rawlsian reasoning, to 
wit that morally arbitrary factors should not 
influence  the  distribution  of  social  goods 
unless  they  contribute  to  improving  the 
conditions of the least advantaged members 
of  society.  If  the  group  that  should  be 
assigned absolute priority is defined as those 
who are below an absolute cut-off line, then 
no absolute priority is  assigned to the worst 
off in cases where everyone in fact is above the 
absolu~e  cut-off  line.  But  this  does  not 
nsccssari!y  imply  that  morally  arbitrary 
hctors do not play an important role  in the 
distribution  of  social  in  these  cases, 
which  is  easily  seen  if  we  accept  that  it  is 
always possible  to  increase the level of well- 
being of the rnore fortunate group in society. 
Then  anv  ;ibsolurz  cut-off  line  has' che 
- 
potential of referring  to a low level of well- 
being in a future society, and thereby -  within 
such a framework -  morally arbitrary factors 
are allowed to play a decisive role in deciding 
the  opportunities  enjoyed  by  people. 
Morever,  if  we  accept  that  (in  some cases) 
people  above  this  absolute  line  also  are 
deprived as a consequence of morally arbitra- 
ry factors, then we need to establish a further 
argument that explains why we assign abso- 
lute  priority  to one  part  of  the  deprived 
group. I find it difficult to see an argument of 
this  lund that  is  consistent with  the moral 
premise of Rawls'  theory, and hence, in my 
view, an absolute cut-off line seems difficult 
to defend within the Rawlsian framework in 
connection to the Difference Principle. 
To conclude: As  I  see it, if we  accept the 
moral  premise  that  natural  capacity  and 
starting  point  in  life  are  morally  arbitrary 
factors, then it follows that it is  unfair  that 
some  people - due to  differences  in these 
factors -  have a lower level of well-being than 
others.  In  every  society,  the  fair  solution 
would  be  to  redistribute  the  amount  of 
resources present so that everyone enjoys the 
same  opportunities  in  life.  Roughly,  this 
makes  the level  of well-being  that everyone 
can  enjoy  if  we  have  a  fair  distriburion  of 
resources a fixed point in our discussion, and 
hence a relative definition of the cut-off line is 
unavoidable within the Rawlsian framework. 
However,  as  we  already  have  discussed,  a 
Leximingroup Principle defined by invoking 
such a cut-off line cannot serve as a final prin- 
ciple in social choices, because it violates  the 
Pareto Principle (or the Bettsrness Principle). 
Thus we  seem  to  have  reached  :in  impasss. 
But that rnay be due to coo ambitious an aiin 
of che discussion, 211  issilz I [low [urn co. 
Justice and Poverty 
((  Rawls  (1  97  1) argues  that  [i]  nequali  ties  are 
permissibls  ivhcn  they  inuiinis;.  .  .  the  long term expectations of the least fortunate group 
in society" (p.  151). I have argued that this 
certainly should be the case, but it does not 
follow from this that a society with inequality 
is  more just  than  a society where  everyone 
the same level of well-being A society 
inequality should be  considered  as 
just within the Rawlsian framework, because 
in such a society no one is deprived because of 
morally  arbitrary  factors.  This  gives  us  a 
reason  for prefering  a society with equality, 
though  other  reasons  may  outweigh  the 
concern  for  justice  in  certain  cases.  The 
Pareto Principle is one such reason; in certain 
cases, everyone may prefer an unjust society 
in comparison with a just society, and in these 
situations  we  should  choose  the  unjust 
society. 
The fact  that  we  may  prefer  an  unjust 
society to a just  society does not tell us that 
justice  is  of no relevance in  debating social 
choices. As  is  well-known, we  may prefer a 
pareto-inefficient  social  state  to  a  Pareto- 
efficient social state, but no one will  argue 
that this  implies that the concept of Pareto 
efficiency is without interest. Moreover, it is 
obviously of  interest  to  rank various  social 
states according to a principle of justice, and 
in this case we are told by Rawlsian reasoning 
to focus on the part of the population that is 
below the average level of income in society. 
This gives us a non-arbitrary cut-off line, and 
hence a non-arbitrary definition of the least 
advantaged group in society. However, there 
is  one  important  distinction  between  the 
Pareto  Principle  and  The  Leximingroup 
Principle (as sketched here). In social choices, 
we  shall  always  endorse  a  Pareto-improve- 
ment, though not always an improvement in 
the  space  of  justice  as  defined  by  the 
Leximingroup Principle.  Possibly,  a reason- 
able structure on social choices could then be 
to  give  absolute  priority  to  the  Pareto 
Principle,  and  then  use  the  Leximingroup 
Principle -  where the least advantaged group 
is defined as everyone below the average level 
of  well-being - to  choose  between  Pareto- 
efficient social states.16 
What  about  our  understanding  of  the 
concept of poverty? Has our detour into the 
Rawlsian  framework  contributed  in  any 
significant way in this respect? It follows from 
the discussion that the Difference Principle of 
Rawls provides us with a possible interpreta- 
tion of the concept of poverty. If we accept 
the moral premises underlying the derivation 
of  this  principle,  we  may  argue  that  the 
problem  of poverty reflects  the problem  of 
injustice.  In  this  case,  we  should  define 
people  as  poor  if  they  have  less  than  the 
average level of well-being in society, and we 
should care about this  problem  because we 
accept that it is  unfair that morally arbitrary 
factors  influence  the  level  of  well-being 
enjoyed  by  people.  Obviously,  this  raises  a 
new question, to wit how to define the refe- 
rence society in a discussion of justice. I shall 
not  elaborate  on  this  issue  here,  but  the 
possibility for distinguishing  between  local, 
national, and global poverty lines should be 
obvious.  l7 Moreover, we should be carehl in 
defining  the  average  level  of  well-being  in 
society, because -  as Sen has underlined in his 
work - there  are  important  differences  in 
people's ability to convert resources into well- 
being.''  But the average level of income in a 
16. Of  course, we need to be more precise on how to settle conflicts within the least advantaged group, but that is 
an issue I leave for another occasion. 
17. R~wls  (1971, 1993) has in mind the nation as the reference society, but see (among others) Pogge (1989) for a 
discussion of ~lobdizino,  the Rawlsian view on justice. 
18. See Sen (1  992). society may serve as  a  benchmark.  Correc- 
tions  could  then  be  made  for  particular 
groups with different abilities in this matter. 
But is  this poverty line very attractive? Is 
this what the World Bank had in mind when 
they argued  that  the alleviation  of poverty 
should have high priority among the world's 
policymakers? Presumably  not,  but  let  me 
add a few (rough) empirical comments to the 
discussion before we  settle this  issue.  If we 
take a global perspective on the distribution 
problem,  then  it  follows  from  the  line  of 
thought that we have pursued in this paper (if 
we  are  willing  to  accept  some  simplifying 
assumptions with respect to the ~roblem  of 
interpersonal comparison of well-being)  that 
one possible interpretation of the concept of 
poverty is to say that people should be con- 
sidered  as  poor  if  they have  less  than  the 
average level of income measured globally. If 
we  accept  real  GDP per  capita  as  a  rough 
point of departure  for  this  brief  empirical 
investigation,  then within our framework a 
representative person in countries with GDP 
per capita below $ 5.120 is  p00r.l~  Is this an 
- 
unreasonable claim? By way of illustration, it 
implies that a representative person in Brazil 
is just above the poverty line and a represen- 
tative person in Tunisia just below the pover- 
ty line, and, moreover, obviously, a represen- 
tative person in every Scandinavian country is 
far above and in most African  countries far 
below this poverty line. In my  view, this is not 
an outlandish statement about global poverty, 
:nd  hence the Difference Principle of Rawls 
may seem to shed some light on the debate 
about how to define the concept of poverty. 
Nevertheless,  most  people  will  probably 
insist that we should settle for a low absolute 
poverty  line  (covering  undernutrition  and 
alike issues) or a low relative cut-off line (like 
20% of the average income in society). The 
problem  with  these  suggestions  is  the 
following: They are arbitrary as  they stand, 
because  it is  difficult to see why we should 
give absolute priority to people below these 
poverty  lines  in  a  normative  discussion. 
However, it may be the case, as indicated in 
the first part of this paper, that an absolute 
poverty line can be given normative defence 
within the Rawlsian framework by invoking 
the first principle of justice  of Rawls. In this 
case, the problem of poverty will reflect the 
absence of essential social conditions for the 
adequate development of citizens as  rational 
and reasonable persons. What these essential 
conditions  are  is  a  further  difficult  issue 
which it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
elaborate on, but if we  accept  this general 
statement  then  the  following  structure 
emerge from the Rawlsian framework.20  The 
problem of poverty -  defined in the context 
of the first principle  of justice -  should be 
assigned  absolute  priority,  and  reflects  the 
presence  of  severe  injustice.  However, 
extensive injustice may persist even if poverty 
is  alleviated.  The  Difference  Principle  of 
Rawls gives us another cut-off line of impor- 
tance in these cases -  the Rawlsian framwork 
gives  us  a very  good  reason  for  not caring 
about  those  just  above  average  income  in 
relation to justice; everyone that is not in the 
least  advantaged  group  according  to  this 
definition  has - due  to  morally  arbitrary 
19. The figures reported here are from UNDP (1994). Measures of real GDP  are developed on an internationally 
comp.?rable sde  using purchasing power parities. 
20. Moreover,  it would  be  necessary  to provide  a good account of why we  should assign  absolute priority to 
establishing social conditions (whatever they should be) for che adequate development of nllcitizens as free and 
equal persons. Rawls (1  993:310-315) sketches a ~rocedurd  argument, but, in my view, this passage is not very 
convincing. 
-  - - factors -  more than what everyone could have 
enjoyed  in  this  society  if  resources  were  .  ~ 
distributed equally. 
Find remarks 
-To  alleviate  the  problem  of  poverty  is 
CGnsidered to be of utter importance in most 
societies;  both  at  the  local,  national,  and 
alobal level. At the same time there is no clear 
b 
understanding of what it means to attain this 
:~irn,  due to the lack of a precise and reason- 
able  definition  of  the  concept  of  poverty. 
 heref fore, the purpose of this paper has been 
threefold. First, I have attempted to illustrate 
the close link between the concept of poverty 
and  normative  reasoning.  Second,  I  have 
explored  the  possibility  of  defining  the 
concept of poverty within the framework of 
Rawlsian reasoning. I have indicated how the 
Difference  Principle  may provide  suppport 
for  one  interpretation  of  the  concept  of 
poverty, but probably a more promising route 
would be to link the discussion of poverty to 
Rawls' first principle of justice. More work is 
needed in order to attain any definite results 
in this respect. Third, I have argued that the 
Difference  Principle  proposed  by  Rawls 
cannot  serve  as  a  final  principle  in  social 
choices, but should be viewed as an express- 
ion of how to evaluate changes in the dimen- 
sion  of  jusrice  when  the  least  advantaged 
vroup is defined as everyone that has less than  b 
the average level of well-being in a society. In 
an overall evaluation of social choices, other 
r.spects than justice should also be taken into 
account, and one possible social choice rule 
can be to apply rhe Pareto Principle and the 
Diifcrence  Principle in  a hierarchical struc- 
rcrz,  where  the  Pareto  Principle  is  given 
absclutc prior: y. 
In this paper, I have avoided saying that we 
ought ro accept [he framework of Rawls, and 
thar  have a duty ro comply ro  the prin- 
cipies derived from this line of resoning. Such 
statements would immediately be attacked by 
defenders of naturalism, who, like Binmore 
(1  994), would argue that "if one chooses to 
define ethical theory to exclude those ozlghts 
which can be deduced from an is,  [then that] 
would  force  me  into  agreement  with 
Nietzsche  that  there  are  no  moral  pheno- 
mena" (p. l l-  12). Hence, in  the framework 
of naturalism, The  Rawlsian line of reasoning 
lacks foundation, because there is no founda- 
tion for any moral theory. Rorty (1989) pro- 
vides  an  insightful  response  to  this  view: 
"[Alny  attempt  to  drive  one's  opponent 
against  a  wall ...  fails  when  the wall  against 
which he is  driven comes to be seen as one 
more vocabulary, one more way of describing 
things.  The wall  then  turns  out  to  be  a 
painted  backdrop,  one more work of man, 
one more bit of cultural stage-setting" (p. 52). 
The framework of naturalism  is  as  much a 
work of man as the Rawlsian framework, and 
the message of Rorty (1989) is that it is futile 
to aim at deciding which of these frameworks 
are true. Both describe one possible way of 
approaching these issues, and thus both offer 
a. perspective that we may take up in our lifes. 
The story of this paper is simply that if we 
adopt  the  perspective  suggested  by  Rawls 
(1971,1993), then we  can  single out some 
interesting  definitions  of  the  concept  of 
poverty.  Other perspectives  will  give  other 
answers  on  this  issue,  but  that  is  not  a 
problem  for  the  arguments  present  in  this 
paper. 
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